This article discusses my work in the last few years on logical formalisms which have been shown to be useful to various aspects of Natural and Programming Languages and for foundational formalisms. In this period, I have been involved in two extensive programs:
Hence Type Theory stepped in and played an important role in applied formal semantics. In natural language semantics, where logic has been of more concern than expressiveness, restrictive typing systems have been the norm. By contrast, programming language semantics has tended to focus on expressiveness (and functions) rather than logic, and hence depended on a less restrictive, or polymorphic, type systems. For example, Milner's functional language ML in Milner 84] used a polymorphic type theory (Curry's ! system). In Type Theory there are attempts at unifying the various formalisms (see de Bruijn 78], Barendregt 92] and NK 94]) so that results can be carried across theories without duplication of work. It is moreover elegant to have unique formulations of Type Theories. After all, such uni cation will help to rid of the anarchy present as a result of so many di erent formulations. In fact, the presence of the paradoxes lead to the emergence of many Type Theories which vary in how they combine logic and expressiveness. Each such theory has been used for some applications, yet the need has come to extend results from one application to another. Hence, it is important to represent type theories in one unique framework. This is di cult as the framework which formulates one theory may be incompatible with the framework of All the above expressions should be obvious except for and which we explain as follows.
is to be understood as saying that is a proposition. In Kamareddine 92b], it was needed to make the construction of logic inside the type free -calculus non paradoxical. Although the system in this paper is in fact typed, we will see in Section 1.1.3 that it contains the system T H of Kamareddine 92b] which is type free. Moreover, the typing system will avoid Russell's paradox with the help of the notion of circular types which will be de ned further on in this section. So it might seem that is only cosmetic. This is not so however. We will below de ne a property theory and this will need the operator. There will of course be a relation between the two ways of avoiding the paradox (i.e. the one presented here and that presented in Kamareddine 92b]). It may be questioned why we have three kinds: types, ctypes and metatypes. In particular, why we need both types and metatypes and what is the di erence between h ; i and ( ! ). First, for types we have the non-problematic types as he; ei and he; pi and the circular types which lead to the problems as hhe; pi; pi (see the rule: c-type base). Abstraction over these circular types is what leads to paradoxes. For example, if R x:<e;p> ::(xx) then RR = : (RR) and RR is of type p, which is a contradiction.
This is the reason why in the rule ( ) in De nition 1.2, we forbid abstracting over circular types. Hence, as << e; p >; p > is circular, R above is not allowed. As for metatypes, they play another role. Namely, they give the type of a lifting function. Here, let us recall that we live in a domain where all types are subsumed by e. Hence, for example, an expression of type he; ei is also an expression of type e. Hence, we are taking a similar line to that of Bealer in Bealer 82] where everything is an object and app applies an object to another. Now, sometimes we need to lift an object to a real function, so that if the object was of type he; ei, the function will be of metatype e ! e, and where ( )( ) = app( ; ).
This is necessary when we want to claim that our approach doesn't restrict itself to Bealer's claim that one only needs objects, nor to Chierchia's claim that one needs both objects and functions. We have a exible account where one can use the one or the other. Moreover, we have two ways of forming predicative expressions: via (which forms a predicative expression denoting an object) and via (which forms a predicative expression denoting a function).
There are also two ways of applying a predicative expression to an argument: via app, which takes a predicative expression denoting an object and via real functional application, which takes a predicative expression denoting a function. These two ways of forming predicative expressions and of saturating them are related, as we shall see below.
Judgements` The type free -calculus ( for short) has ::= xj( 1 2 )j( x: 1 ) for terms. We can embed the type free -calculus in our system T via the embedding function J :
De nition 1.3
We de ne an embedding function J : 7 ! T , which embeds in T as follows: are di erent. They include, like the system here, types and metatypes. c-types however are replaced by three other types, le-, fp-and wb-types. The idea is that fp-types play a similar role to c-types. That is, they are both circular. le-and wb-types however, are there to avoid negative judgements in the type inference rule ( ). That is, instead of adding the condition 6 c-type we add the condition` wb-type, meaning that is a well behaved type and that abstracting to the type will not lead to contradiction. le-types were an intermediate step between fp-types and wb-types. That is not the end of the story. In fact, the typing system obtained in KK93] is rather di erent from that of this paper. We can understand the di erence by giving two types which are comparable in one and not in the other. 
De nition 1.16 (Sorts)
The basic sorts of PT 1 are e; u; nf and i. These stand for individuals, urelements, nominalized functions and information units, respectively. The only complex sort is (e ! e).
De nition 1.17 (Syntax of PT 1 ) The syntax of PT 1 is as follows: For any sort , let ME be the meaningful expressions of sort . If = e; i; u or nf, then V ar is a denumerable set of variables of sort . If is any sort, Con is a set of constants of sort . The expressions of each sort are de ned as follows:
i: V ar ; Con ME ii: If 2 ME e and x 2 V ar e ; then x: 2 ME (e!e) iii: If 2 ME nf ; then 2 ME (e!e) iv: If 2 ME (e!e) ; then \ 2 ME nf v: If 2 ME (e!e) and 2 ME e ; then ( ) 2 ME e vi: ME i ME u ; ME u ; ME nf ME e vii: If 2 ME e ; then y 2 ME i viii: If ; ' 2 ME i ; ; 0 2 ME e ; and x 2 V ar ; for any sort ; then = 0 ; : ; _ '; ^'; 8x: ; 9x: ; '; $ ' are all in ME i
Note that y asserts the truth of , such that if 2 ME i then y is its truth value but if 6 2 ME i then y will be false.
De nition 1.18 (Axioms of PT 1 )
The axioms of the theory are as follows:
( That is, one can go from to y if is an information unit (i.e. a proposition) and is atomic. Now let us interpret PT 1 in T . First we start by interpreting the sorts into our kinds. For this we introduce the function : Sorts 7 ! Kind fu 0 g such that:
The sort u strictly corresponds to our type e minus the type he; ei. Since we have no way of proving that there is such a type in T , we postulate u 0 which represents u. This will not a ect our discussion below, and hence we shall proceed.
We introduce for each expression of PT 1 the relevant environment of , env( ) as follows:
if 2 var Con 2: env( x: ) = env( ) if 2 ME e and x 2 V ar e 3: env( ) = env( ) if 2 ME nf 4: env( \ ) = env( ) if 2 ME e!e 5: env( ( )) = env( ) env( ) if 2 ME e!e and 2 ME e 6: env(y ) = env( ) if 2 ME e 7: env( = ) = env( ) env( ) if ; 0 2 ME e 8: env(: ) = env( ) if 2 ME i 9: env( op ') = env( ) env(') if ; ' 2 ME i ; op =^; _; ; $ 10: env(Qx: ) = env( ) if 2 ME i ; x 2 V ar and Q = 8; 9
What if env( ) and env( 0 ) overlap? That is, what if env( ) contains (x:e) and env ( 0 ) contains (x:p)? If this is the case, we can solve it by taking (x:p) to be the common element. This should not occur however if we assume that the variables and constants of each sort are disjoint from those of any other sort. We now introduce a mapping Tr which takes expressions of PT 1 and returns expressions in T . This is de ned as follows: 
2
The above shows that PT 1 of Chierchia, Turner 88] can be considered as a subtheory of T .
T-Tree
Now collecting the results, we draw the picture which relates all these various theories. We add Milner's ML as it has been shown in Kamareddine 92a] to be interpretable in L .
T r r r r r r r r r r r r
T H r r r r r r r r r r 
Property Theories
Our interest in property theory stems from the fact that properties and propositions are strongly related and provide the logical part of the system (whereas type theory is going to provide the expressive part of the system). Our domain of properties will satisfy important closure properties which will make the logic simple to reason with. Moreover, properties will play an important role in predicatives which can be looked at in the Fregean sense or in the sense of Bealer. Our approach furthermore, permits us to distinguish between predication and abstraction. To talk about such predicative expressions, we introduce in our language T the operator (see Kamareddine 92b] ), understanding to mean that is a property.
is de ned as = df 8x: (app( ; x)). That is, something is a property i whenever it applies to an object, the result is a proposition. We construct further properties in the following way:
1. 0 = df x:(app( ; x) _ app( 0 ; x)) 2. \ 0 = df x:(app( ; x)^app( 0 ; x)) 3. = df x::app( ; x) 4. ! 0 = df x:8y(app( ; y) app( 0 ; app(x; y)) 5. = df x:(x = x) 6. = df x::(x = x) Lemma 2. The following lemma shows that the internal logic (which occurs inside the , such as x:' and x:' give x: ) and the external logic (which occurs outside and is the usual one), can be uni ed. That is, the logic of our propositions and the logic of our properties are the same. Computationally, this means that logical connectives can be pushed inside the -operator. The characteristic property of every', , is de ned by: P 1 P 2 = df 8x(P 1 x ! P 2 x).
Lemma 3.1 is a transitive, re exive and equisymmetric relation on properties.
2
Lemma 3.2 If P 1 and P 2 are properties then (every 0 P 1 P 2 ) and every 0 P 1 P 2 = P 1 P 2 . 2
We de ne P 1 \ 1 P 2 = df 9z(P 1 z^P 2 z).
Lemma 3.3 If P 1 and P 2 are properties then (a 0 P 1 P 2 ) and a 0 P 1 P 2 = P 1 \ 1 P 2 .
Outside the collection of properties, we cannot draw useful conclusions about every' because we cannot decide the propositionhood of an arbitrary formula in which ! is the main connective. This is not a disadvantage as we only want every' to have meaning when we are working with properties. Moreover, we cannot de ne the type of every' or of determiners inside our formal language. That is if we de ne Quant and Det as follows
then there is no way to prove that Det and Quant always return propositions when applied to terms, because 8x( x ! Quant (tx)) and 8x( x ! (tx)) are not propositions for any t. In fact even if t is a property, we still do not have a guarantee that Det t and Quant t are propositions, due to the fact that x is not a proposition. This is not serious as there is no particular reason for wanting determiners and quanti ers to be determinate. We can prove many desirable features of our determiners, so why insist on determinability? Having determiners such as every', a' is one thing; being able to deduce that every', a' are determiners is something else. I.e. can we prove that Det(every'), Det(a'), etc..? Take for every', x: y:8z xz ! yz]. To show that Det(every') we have to show that 8x( x ! 8y( y ! H(every 0 xy))). But to be able to show the implication we need to have ( x), and ( y), which we cannot assume. For this we need an extension for implication as follows: We always have that if fag`b then f ag`a ! b (our version of the deduction theorem). We need that if f ag`b then` a ! b. Can we assert this rule? That is:
Lemma 3.4 Det(every'), Det(a'), if (*) holds. (See Kamareddine 92b] for the proof.) 2
Here we are concerned with some characteristics of determiners that can be proven in our theory. We start with the rst theorem that asserts that the result of applying a quanti er to a property results in a proposition. Lemma 3.5
where a c is the complement of a (v) fevery 0 P 1 P 2 ; every 0 P 2 P 3 g`every 0 P 1 P 3 2 4 Intensionality and Extensionality
It is often observed that sentence accent, as an indicator of focus, can a ect the interpretation of sentences, or at least the contexts in which they are appropriate. Thus 
assert(h x:eat(felix; x); the-piei)
One question which this proposal raises is whether`free' focus constructions such as (7) and (8) can ever occur in embedded constructions. Thus consider the following examples:
(10) Sandy was surprised that Felix ate the pie.
(11) Sandy was surprised that Felix ate the pie.
Intuitively, these two sentences can have di erent truth conditions. Suppose, for example, that Felix is known to be both a glutton and a gourmand. Given the alternative delicacies available, it may surprise Sandy that Felix chose the pie to eat. Yet knowing that the pie did in fact get eaten, Sandy may not be surprised that it was Felix that did the eating. If this is correct, then it seems unlikely that the partitioning of meaning into focus and background can be entirely separated out from propositional content. The relation pred which we introduced appears to give us an appropriate amount of structure within propositions. By comprehension, we know that the following equations hold:
app( x:eat(felix; x); the-pie) = eat(felix; the-pie) = app( y:eat(y; the-pie); felix)
However, pred does not support these identities:
pred( x:eat(felix; x); the-pie) 6 = pred( y:eat(y; the-pie); felix)
Obviously, there is an additional pragmatic burden being supported by information structure. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the apparatus we have de ned gives the right kind of negrainedness at the propositional level to support the distinctions which need to be drawn.
In fact, the problem of identifying app( x:eat(felix; x); the-pie) with app( y:eat(y; the-pie); felix)
is a problem of intensionality. Our account does not face this problem as we have another predicate supported by our logic which is intensional. So even though pred( x:eat(felix; x); the-pie) Kamareddine April 7, 1997 has the same truth value as pred( y:eat(y; the-pie); felix), they are not equal. This problem is similar to another one of Bealer and Aczel in Aczel 84a] which is as follows: Rajneeshee = x:follows(x; Rajneesh) Fondalee = x:follows(JaneFonda; x) app(Rajneeshee; JaneFonda) = follows(JaneFonda; Rajneesh) app(Fondalee; Rajneesh) = follows(JaneFonda; Rajneesh) Therefore app(Rajneeshee; JaneFonda) = app(Fondalee; Rajneesh) This conclusion might be questioned since someone could believe that Rajneeshee holds of Fonda, without believing that Fondalee holds of Rajneesh. The solution here is to use pred instead of app. So we obtain that pred(Rajneeshee; JaneFonda) is equivalent in truth value to pred(F ondalee; Rajneesh) but not equal to it. This is another example of the suitability of our framework for intensional and nely-grained contexts.
Polymorphism
Types or levels are not necessary in the avoidance of the paradox. The Foundation Axiom FA was included in ZF despite the fact that it was shown that antifoundation axioms are consistent with ZF (see Aczel 84] for such a discussion). In fact, it is the Axiom of Separation which avoids the paradox. Moreover, the claim in the foundation of NL has been concentrating on abandoning well foundedness. It has been put forward that non well foundedness and type freeness are necessary for NL. Kamareddine 94b], for example, provides a uni ed account of plurals and singulars by using the concept of non well foundedness and type freeness and KK93] uses the notion of type freeness to give a more general interpretation of NL. The fact that we ask for the full expressive power of the type free -calculus does not mean that types are not useful. In fact when we ask for a type free set theory, or a set theory where the de nition of a set may be impredicative, we don't go and forget completely about sets. In type free theories, one asks for the furthest expressive power, where we can live with self reference and impredicativity but without paradoxes. The better such an expressive system is, the more we are moving towards type freeness. It is enough to remember that up to the discovery of the paradoxes, the most ideal system was of course type free. Due to the paradoxes, alas this type free paradise had to be abandoned. Types found an attractive place in the history of foundation and in most areas of applications of logic. However, types are useful yet we must have as much type freeness as possible. In fact we may not want to be in exible from the start if we could a ord to be exible. Type free theories are very elegant and simple, so we can have a clear picture of how much we have and how the paradox is avoided. Then the detail of constructing types if followed will produce all the polymorphic higher order types that are needed. So a lot of unnecessary details (like constructing types) are left till later which will make it easier to prove results about the strength of the system and the expressive power. Also from the point of view of computation, type free theories could be regarded as rst order theories and hence are computionally more tractable than typed theories. Completeness also holds for rst order logics but has to be forced for higher order ones. Hence what we are arguing for is the use of type freeness followed by the construction of exible polymorphic types. It is also the case that the self referentiality of language requires type freeness. So we can talk about a property having itself as a property. For example, the property of those things equal to themselves is equal to itself. We can talk about more involved self-referential properties such as the property of properties that apply to themselves, the set of functions which given an argument x, apply the function x:f(xx) to itself.
Promiscuity and Polymorphism
From a pretheoretic point of view, natural language expressions clearly enjoy a great deal of combinatorial exibility. A familiar example is the conjunctive and which places very few constraints on the category of its arguments, except perhaps that they be of the same category. Similarly, many verbs can combine with a range of di erent complements: (14) a. Lee proved that 13 was a prime number. b. Lee proved the proposition that 13 was a prime number. c. Lee proved his claim. d. Lee proved it.
Such combinatorial exibility deserves a name: let us call it functional promiscuity, following the lead of Hobbs 85] . How should we model functional promiscuity? We could take the approach favoured by Bealer 82], and claim that natural language is entirely type free; or else we could say that there are some type restrictions, but that the type system has enough slop in it to allow the requisite amount of promiscuity. Although Bealer's approach certainly deserves to be explored, it seems to be committed to the view that syntactic categories in natural language are entirely arbitrary, in that they have no semantic import. It seems implausible that we can analyse natural languages in an economical manner while completely eschewing syntactic categories. Yet it also seems implausible that, say, the distinction between noun phrases and sentences is completely unmotivated from a semantic point of view. Yet if we concede that syntactic categories do have some correlation with semantic domains, then we are essentially admitting types after all. Let us assume, then, that types are an appropriate tool in the task of analysing natural languages. Then we might still jump in one of two ways in the face of data like (14). We could conclude that each of the complements shown in (14) is of the same type, in which case we would be forced to the conclusion that words like it, this and something have multiple types. Alternatively, we might suppose that it has just the type of singular NPs, as distinct from the type of propositions, in which case we have to conclude that prove is polymorphically typed. As Parsons ( Parsons 79] ) shows, some amount of polymorphism is also entailed on the approach where noun phrases like the proposition are analysed as having the same type as subordinate clauses such as that 13 was a prime number. For then we see that, for example, about must be polymorphic:
(15) a. Kim talked about the proposition.
b. Kim talked about Sandy.
Kamareddine 94a] gives a detailed account of Parsons' approach and interprets it in a theory L which we showed earlier to be a subtheory of T . Hence Parsons account can also be looked at as a subtheory of T .
5.2 Fixed points, self application and a programming example -calculus is at the heart of the denotational semantics of programming languages. Programming languages moreover range between the strictly and in exibly typed languages (such as Pascal where you can only apply functions to a certain type) and the polymorphically typed ones such as Milner's ML. Even the polymorphically typed languages are not polymorphic enough. In fact, the programming discipline which praises polymorphism non stop and which claims to be o ering highly polymorphic languages, namely functional programming, has not yet provided a language which can make sense of the type of a xed point operator, or any function which involves self application. This is somewhat anomalous, as functional languages are claimed to be based on the -calculus (and in particular on the type free or the polymorphic -calculus). Now in these -calculus, the xed point operators and self application play a very important role. Without them, we could not show that the solution to the recursive equations exists. So isn't it strange that the most important items such as self application and the xed point operators cannot be typechecked in functional languages? After all they are the items which show us what the computable/non computable functions are. They are the items which solve the recursive equations, and they are the items which inform us about the looping/nonlooping programs. Furthermore, Milner's ML is based on the language !Curry which cannot typecheck x :xx nor Y . The polymorphism of ML which is based on !Curry is not strong enough. The polymorphism introduced in this paper however, is strong enough to type check items involving self application. We shall illustrate this below.
Example 5.1 The translation of f:( x:f(xx))( x:f(xx)) in T has type hhv 2 ; v 2 i; v 2 i. Before we show this, let us write A for x:hhv 1 ; v 2 i; v 2 i:app(f; app(x; x)) and write B for x:hv 1 ; v 2 i:app(f; app(x; x)). Now, the magical part of the program which takes the type of f to be hv 2 ; v 2 i and the type of x to be hhv 1 ; v 2 i; v 2 i is a very important part of Kamareddine 92a] and there is no room to discuss it here. But let us see how, when the types of f and x are chosen, the type checker deduces the type of the translation of Y . The type of Y is really what it should be. Not only that, but functional languages took polymorphism on their shoulders and avoided logic due to the reason that logic and strong polymorphism together lead to paradoxes. Now we have showed that our system supports a higher polymorphism than functional languages but it also contains logic as we've seen before. In fact this system has been used to extend ML with polymorphism and logic in
Kamareddine 92a]. And even though the system allows terms such as x:xx and type check them, all terms which are paradoxical are not typed and the system displays the message that their type is circular. So Russell's and Curry's sentences cannot be type checked and we are told that they are circular. Of course here, one may wonder if the paradox is really avoided, and may give as an example y:( x:y(xx)) which is typechecked to hhv 2 ; v 2 i; hhv 2 ; v 2 i; v 2 ii, and then instantiate it to : which would be of type hhp; pi; pi. This does not hold however because hhp; pi; pi is circular and the system does not accept such instantiation. Now, let us say a few words about the computable tractability of the type system T . This question is particularly important as we have a rich set of types and as the subsumption relation may lead to complex (and non-terminating) type checkers. We have no problems however with T . The reason being that the system of Kamareddine 92a] is the same system as this paper except that there, we did not have metatypes. Now, subsumption does not play any role in metatypes. So computable tractability (which is a characteristic of the system of Kamareddine 92a] and of its type checker) transforms easily to T . In fact, one can take the implementation we have for Kamareddine 92a] and extend it with just the rules for metatypes and we obtain an automatic type checker for T . Finally, let us list some terms and say how the type checker of Kamareddine 92a] treats them and type check them. This is relevant for this paper as if we write a type checker for T , then it will behave exactly the type checker behaves for Kamareddine 92a] except of course that there are no metatypes. Hence, on types we are the same. Note that if a term contains x where x is not explicitly typed (as in the rst term below) then the type checker will nd the type itself. error, c-type Here don't be alarmed by the type of the sentences 7-10. These are sentences which involve 8 and hence their type should be p. When the system can't make the type p, it returns an error message as in sentence 8.
The item notation
The work described in the previous section extends to various other applications that I have not described in this paper due to lack of space. The second program however that I have been involved with is related to a new notation (the item notation) in uenced by the AU-THOMATH of de Bruijn. The results that we have obtained in the last four years are very nice and are summarized in our literature below. Of these results, I will brie y describe some points. First let me explain what is the item notation. The item notation is very simple. It follows the AUTHOMATH by writing the argument before the function. The di erence however is that parenthesis in a term are grouped di erently than in usual lambda calculus or in AUTHOMATH. The best to describe the item notation is to give the translation from classical lambda calculus to item notation based one. So that, if I translates classical terms into our notation, then I(AB) is written as (I(B) )I(A) and I( x:A :B) is written as (I(A) x )I(B). Both (A ) and (A x ) are called items.
Explicit substitution
Substitution is the most basic operation of the -calculus. Manipulation of -terms depends on substitution. The -and -axioms are given in terms of substitution. What substitution are we talking about? Substitution in the -calculus is usually de ned (up to some variation) as t x := t 0 ]. So what is happening in t x := t 0 ]? We are replacing all free occurrences of x in t by t 0 , but without any disastrous side e ects such as binding occurrences of variables which were originally free. Take for example xx x := y]. This will result in yy. ( y:u :xy) x := y] will result in z:u :yz. So this process of substitution works ne. It is a metalevel process however. That is, this substitution takes t; x; t 0 and returns a nal result t x := t 0 ]. The various stages of moving from the t; x; t 0 to t x := t 0 ] are lost and nothing matters but the result. This works ne for many applications but fails in areas which are now becoming vital in Computer Science. In functional programming for example, there is an interest in partial evaluation. That is, given xx x := y], we may not be interested in having yy as the result of xx x := y] but rather only yx x := y]. In other words, we only substitute one occurrence of x by y and continue the substitution later. This issue of being able to follow substitution and decide how much to do and how much to postpone, has become a major one in functional language implementation. However, in order to have this spreading control over substitution and to be able to manipulate those partially substituted terms, we must render the latter from being a metalevel notion to an object level notion. It turns out that our new notation will enable such rendering e ciently and will enable the representation of various forms of substitution: local, global, implicit and explicit.
KN 93] introduces substitution which is object level but which can evaluate -terms fully obtaining the result of the metalevel substitution. More precisely, we introduce the process of stepwise substitution, which is meant to re ne reduction procedures. Since substitution is the fundamental operation in -reduction, being in its turn the most important relation in lambda calculus, we are in the heart of the matter. The stepwise substitution is embedded in the calculus, thus giving rise to what is nowadays called explicit substitution. It is meant as the nal re nement of -reduction, which has { to our knowledge { not been studied before to this extent. This substitution relation, being the formalization of a process of stepwise substitution, leads to a natural distinction between a global and a local approach. With global substitution we mean the intended replacement of a whole class of bound variables (all bound by the same abstraction-) by a given term; for local substitution we have only one of these occurrences in view. Both kinds of substitution play a role in mathematical applications, global substitution in the case of function application and local substitution for the \unfolding" of a particular instance of a de ned name. We discuss several versions of stepwise substitution and the corresponding reductions. We also extend the usual notion ofreduction, an extension which is an evident consequence of local substitution. The framework for the description of terms, as explained before, is very adequate for this matter.
Generalising reduction and term reshu ing
Example 6.1 In the classical term t (( x 7 :X 4 :( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 )x 2 )x 1 , we have the following redexes (the fact that neither x 6 nor x 7 appear as free variables in their respective scopes does not matter here; this is just to keep the example simple and clear):
1. ( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 2. ( x 7 :X 4 :( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 )x 2
In item notation t becomes (x 1 )(x 2 )(X 4 x 7 )(x 3 )(X 3 x 6 )((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 )(x 4 )x 5 . Here, the two classical redexes correspond to -pairs as follows:
1. ( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 corresponds to (x 3 )(X 3 x 6 ). ((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 )(x 4 )x 5 is ignored as it is easily retrievable in item notation. It is the maximal subterm of t to the right of (X 3 x 6 ).
2. ( x 7 :X 4 :( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 )x 2 corresponds to (x 2 )(X 4 x 7 ).
Again (x 3 )(X 3 x 6 )((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 )(x 4 )x 5 is ignored for the same reason as above.
There is however a third redex which is not immediately visible in the classical term; namely, ( x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 1 . Such a redex will only be visible after we have contracted the above two redexes (we will not discuss the order here). In fact, assume we contract the second redex in the rst step, and the rst redex in the second step. I.e.
(( x 7 :X 4 :( x 6 :X 3 : x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 3 )x 2 )x 1 ! (( Now, even though all these three redexes are needed in order to get the normal form of t, only the rst two were visible in the classical term at rst sight. The third could only be seen once we had contracted the rst two redexes. In item notation, the third redex ( x 5 :X 1 !X 2 :x 5 x 4 )x 1 is visible as it corresponds to the matching (x 1 )((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 ) where (x 1 ) and ((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 ) are separated by the segment (x 2 )(X 4 x 7 )(x 3 )(X 3 x 6 ). Hence, by extending the notion of a redex from being a -item adjacent to a -item, to being a matching pair of -and -items, we can make more redexes visible. This extension furthermore is simple, as in (t 1 )s( v ), we say that (t 1 ) and ( v ) match if s has the same structure as a matching composite of opening and closing brackets, each -item corresponding to an opening bracket and each -item corresponding to a closing bracket. For example, in t above, (x 1 ) and ((X 1 ! X 2 ) x 5 ) match as (x 2 )(X 4 x 7 )(x 3 )(X 3 x 6 ) has the bracketing structure ] ] (see Figure 1 which is drawn ignoring types just for the sake of argument). With this (x 1 ) (x 2 ) ( x 7 ) (x 3 ) ( x 6 ) ( x 5 ) (x 4 ) x 5
Figure 1: Redexes in item notation extension of redexes, we re ne -reduction in two di erent ways:
1. By changing ( ) from (t 1 )( v )t 2 ! t 2 v := t 1 ] to (t 1 )s( v )t 2 ; s(t 2 v := t 1 ]) if (t 1 ) and ( v ) match. 2. By reshu ing terms so that matching 's and 's occur adjacently. Hence Figure 1 will be redrawn as in Figure 2 .
(c ) (P x ) (b ) (Q y ) (d ) (R z ) (a ) z The intended meaning of a de nition is that the de niendum x can be substituted by the de niens a in the expression b. In a sense, an expression let x : A be a in b is similar to ( x:A :b)a. It is not intended however to substitute all the occurrences of x in b by a. Nor is it intended that the de nition be a part of our term. Rather, the de nition will live in the environment (or context) in which we evaluate or reason about the expression.
One of the advantages of the de nition let x : A be a in b over ( x:A :b)a is that it is convenient to have the freedom of substituting only some of the occurrences of an expression in a given Kamareddine April 7, 1997 
